Belarus and the Kyoto Protocol: opportunities and challenges by -
 Research Center of 
the Institute for Privatization and Management 
  
 
German Economic Team in Belarus 
 
76 Zakharov Str., 220088 Minsk, Belarus. Tel./fax: +375 (17) 236 11 47, 236 43 95 
E-mail: bmer@ipm.by, internet: http://ipm.by/ic 
 
PP/6/03 
 
 
Belarus and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunities and Challenges 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
1. Introduction........................................................................................................................... 3 
2. GHG Emission Trade................................................................................................................ 3 
2.1. The General Principle......................................................................................................... 3 
2.2. Current Schemes for GHG Emission Trade ............................................................................ 4 
2.3. Financing Opportunities for JI Projects ................................................................................. 4 
2.4. Market Outlook ................................................................................................................. 5 
3. Potential and Benefits for Belarus:............................................................................................. 6 
3.1. The contribution of different categories of sources for GHE...................................................... 6 
3.2. The Investment Climate for JI in Belarus .............................................................................. 7 
4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations................................................................................. 12 
 
 2
Executive Summary 
Global trade of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions as specified by the Kyoto protocol of the 
UNFCCC offers unique possibilities for transition economies such as Belarus. Besides the sale of emission 
rights at the country level in the future, the most interesting opportunity are climate investments (so-
called Joint Implementation (JI) projects) where a foreign investor receives credits on emission reduc-
tions realized through e.g. installation of new technology with lower emission levels. The advantages of 
this scheme are straightforward: the investor receives emission credits that help him to meet the obliga-
tions in his own country, while the host-country, e.g. Belarus, can attract foreign investments, receive 
new technology to modernize its industry, and improve environmental quality. However, from today’s 
perspective of a policy-maker the most interesting consideration is that benefits from JI projects can be 
realized today, five years ahead of the official start of the Kyoto protocol.  The current paper describes 
the underlying developments and mechanisms and gives the necessary recommendations of how to real-
ize this potential. 
During recent years, a global market for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions with a traded vol-
ume estimated at around 160 m tons of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) in 2001 and prices from about USD 0.1 to 
USD 20 per ton has already developed. This is mainly caused by activities of several countries as well as 
private companies who act in anticipation of the Kyoto protocol regulations. The most important exam-
ples are the GHG trading schemes in Denmark and the UK, the emission reduction principle established 
by the European Union earlier this year, and several initiatives of private companies such as the Chicago 
Climate Exchange of the BP Amoco Emissions Trading System. From the perspective of the countries in 
transition, which offer a large potential for climate investments (e.g. fuel switching or increasing energy 
efficiency), the most promising development is the establishment of so-called Carbon funds financed by 
the World Bank (USD 150 m) as well as by the governments of the Netherlands (USD 26 m), Germany 
(EUR 50 m) and France (intended). Those funds anticipate the future market by purchasing future emis-
sion credits realized in JI projects. In doing so they fulfill several purposes: first, they help establishing 
the necessary experiences and practices of global emission trade and thereby indicate strong commit-
ment towards active climate change mitigation. Second, they provide an opportunity for timely prepara-
tion for firms that otherwise might face costly short-term adjustment measures once the protocol is in 
force. Third, they provide an opportunity for investors to speculate on the future price of emission certifi-
cates. Finally—and most interestingly from the project-country’s perspective—they ensure that rewards 
for climate investments are paid immediately in order to increase credibility of such projects. 
What difficulties might Belarus face in attracting such JI investments? To answer this question we com-
pare current conditions for JI investments in Belarus with those of other transition economies focussing 
on four criteria, the scope for JI, the JI capacity, the Business environment and well as the general in-
vestment climate. We find that Belarus offers a promising perspective for such investments, especially for 
energy-saving projects where the country ranks fifths across 14 transition countries, but that it so far 
does not possess any relevant experiences (JI capacity) and therefore, ranks last in this category. Fur-
thermore, based on standard indicators provided by international organizations and financial institutions 
we demonstrate the large need for improvement in the business environment, where we put special em-
phasize on the energy sector, as well as the general investment climate. Therefore, we conclude that de-
spite the high potential and promising benefits of international GHG emission trade, several institutional 
weaknesses and political pretermissions prevent Belarus from realizing any of those promising benefits at 
the moment. Thus, the following policy recommendations are crucially important: 
A) Sign the Kyoto protocol! 
The Kyoto protocol specifies the rules of the game of international GHG emission trade. Signing this 
treaty is the entry ticket for any type of international GHG emission trade. Otherwise, no emission reduc-
tion can be certified. 
B) Prepare for ratification! 
Two types of activities are necessary: 
• Economic impact study to assess all costs and benefits. 
• Emission accounting according to the standards of the UNFCCC. 
C) Improve institutional conditions! 
This will be important in order to strengthen the position of Belarus when competing for climate invest-
ments with other transition economies. An effective and even rewarding way to do so is by initiating JI 
projects with carbon funds. Typically, this requires signing a Memorandum of Understanding that indi-
cates the country’s approval of the rules of international GHG emission trade as specified in the Kyoto 
protocol. Then, JI projects can be initiated and emission reductions can be paid for even before the coun-
try has eventually ratified the protocol. 
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1. Introduction 
It now seems likely that Belarus will sign the Kyoto Protocol in 2004. Under this international agreement 
the country intends to commit itself to keep its combined greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions below the 
level of 1990. However due to economic decline in 1990-1995, and the change in the pattern of the fuel 
used Belarus’ current level of GHG emissions is actually 1.5 times lower than the level, which will be ne-
gotiated under the Kyoto Protocol. Besides according to the forecast, it is expected that Belarus’ GHG 
emissions would be growing significantly slower than the GDP. Given that the Kyoto Protocol allows coun-
tries to exchange emission reductions in order to meet their obligations, Belarus will be able to sell a part 
of unused emissions rights. According to the preliminary estimations obtained in the paper, potential 
revenue may be from USD 375 m to USD 1.5 bn. Furthermore the Kyoto protocol allows the possibility 
for the country to reduce emissions and collect additional revenues using project-based investments in 
energy saving or emissions abatement technologies. This paper investigates economic and environmental 
benefits are induced by Kyoto mechanisms, and focuses especially on the attractiveness of Belarus for 
climate investment. The paper also addresses some of the challenges that Belarus faces in developing 
and implementing national system to benefit from different mechanisms foreseen in the Protocol, high-
lights areas where there is a need for sustained efforts, and provides preliminary recommendations on 
how these efforts should be designed. 
We will proceed in three parts. First, the different mechanisms of the Protocol are discussed as well as 
existing financial opportunities (funds) for JI projects. Second, some economic implications of Belarus 
signing of the Protocol, and assessment of the JI investment climate are provided. The final section will 
conclude and give the policy recommendations. 
2. GHG Emission Trade 
2.1. The General Principle 
Trading emission certificates is not a new idea. First such ideas have been discussed e.g. in the USA in 
the early 1990s when previous attempts to reduce pollution levels (e.g. smog in large cities) through offi-
cial restrictions and permits have proven unsuccessfully due to large administrative costs. The first con-
crete program, the Regional Clean Air Incentive Market (RECLAIM) and the SO2-Allowance Trading Pro-
gram (SO2-ATP) both started in the USA with a regional or sector-specific focus and the intention to re-
duce emissions of NOx and SO2.
1 Firms in both programs receive emission certificates, which in principle 
are freely tradable. After the first years of operation, both programs have revealed promising results. 
Prices for emission certificates are believed to be efficient (equal to marginal abatement costs) while 
overall reduction targets have been achieved and administrative costs were reduced substantially.2 Thus, 
those emission-trading schemes have proven to realize a pre-specified emission target at the lowest eco-
nomic costs. 
Based on this experience, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) initi-
ated the so-called Kyoto protocol in 1997. The objective of this protocol is to reduce global emission lev-
els of greenhouse gases (GHG) from 2008 to 2012 (the so-called first commitment period) by 5.2% rela-
tive to the level of 19903 by initiating a scheme of global trade scheme of GHG emission certificates4 
Each country that signs the protocol is assigned a certain emission target, the so-called Assigned 
Amounts (AA).5 After ratification, the country is obliged to meet this target in the so-called commitment 
period from 2008 to 2012, either by actively reducing its own emission levels, or by using so-called flexi-
ble instruments of the protocol within which emission certificates can be traded. Those instruments are: 
• Emission Trading (ET): An inventory-based mechanism where a country is allowed to sell the unused 
emission rights (the so-called Assigned Amount Units, AAUs) if actual emission levels over the com-
mitment period (2008-2012) are below the country’s emission target (the Assigned Amount, AA).  
• Joint Implementation (JI): A project-based mechanism where a country achieves a reduction of emis-
sion levels through investment in another country listed in Annex I of the protocol.6 This reduction 
(relative to a pre-specified baseline) is generated into equivalent Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) 
and transferred on its own account. 
• Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): Allows for similar emission reduction projects in developing 
countries (not listed in Annex I). 
                                                          
1 More concrete, the RECLAIM focuses on NOx and SO2.emitting firms in the area of Los Angeles, while SO2-ATP ap-
plies to all power-generating plants in the USA. 
2 For more information see DIW and Öko-Institut (2001): Analyse und Vergleich der flexiblen Instrumente des Kioto 
Protokolls. 
3 A second commitment period is envisaged from 2013 to 2017, but no concrete objectives are specified as of now. 
4 Since the consequences of GHG emission, in particular climate change, are felt globally, GHG emissions are particu-
larly suited for a global trade scheme. 
5 Typically, for countries in transition this target equals their emission levels in 1990. 
6 This list includes Belarus. 
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The logic of those mechanisms is as follows: Countries whose emission levels exceed their targets can 
either buy unused emission certificates through ET from other countries, or they have to actively reduce 
emission levels. However, such reduction efforts do not necessarily have to be located within the country. 
Rather, the two project-based mechanism (JI and CDM) ensure that such projects will be initiated in 
countries where the abatement costs are expected to be the lowest. Given the large differences in e.g. 
technology or energy efficiency across Annex I countries, differences in abatement costs are expected to 
be significant. 
Critics to the Kyoto protocol state that such regulations are harmful for economic development because 
they imply a tax on future economic growth.7 While assigned emission levels are expected to be a serious 
constraint in most OECD countries, this will not be a serious problem for the countries in transition where 
the economic decline during the 1990s has dramatically reduced current emission levels. Furthermore, 
the regulations also allow for so-called banking of own certificates, which means to transfer unused emis-
sion rights of the first commitment period into the second period (2013-2017) in order to prevent that 
the 1990 level will become a binding constraint after 2012. 
2.2. Current Schemes for GHG Emission Trade 
How likely is the protocol to really come into force? According to its statutes, the regulations will enter 
into force if at least 55 countries have ratified it, and if they account for at least 55% of GHG emissions of 
all countries listed in Annex I of the protocol.8 As of September 2003, more than 100 countries have rati-
fied the protocol,9 but they only account for around 44% of GHG emissions. Among the countries with a 
still open position, only Russia accounts for emission levels large enough to enforce the protocol. If they 
reject to do so, will this be the end for the Kyoto protocol? For several reasons we do not think so. First, 
the withdrawal of the USA must not be seen forever and US firms and organizations have so far been one 
of the main driving forces in the development of markets for GHG emissions. Second, China, another 
main GHG emitter, could be taken on board. Third, European countries as well as several companies have 
already developed and implemented several GHG emission trading schemes in order to prepare for the 
regulations of the protocol. Those investments of time and money demonstrate strong commitment to 
the promises made to UNFCCC, and it is unlikely that in particular West European countries will step back 
from this road. The next section will give an overview on already developed trading schemes. 
Several countries have already developed national GHG emission schemes in order to prepare on time for 
the challenges of global emission trade: 
• In 2001, Denmark was the first country that introduced an obligatory system of CO2 emission trade 
among electricity generators, Denmark’s most crucial GHG emitters. 
• In 2002, the UK launched a trading scheme that covers all sectors of the economy on voluntary basis. 
Within this scheme, the government provided a financial incentive of GBP 215 m (USD 309 m) during 
an auction in April 2002 and firms bit for a share of this incentive by offering binding emission reduc-
tion targets. Once the auction was closed, 34 firms have entered the scheme offering a total reduc-
tion of about 4 m t of CO2 equivalent (CO2e). Thus, emission reduction efforts of firms participating in 
this schemes will be rewarded by UKP 53.7 (USD 77.2) per t of CO2e. 
• In 2003, the EU initiated an emission-trading scheme that—with a proposed duration from 2005 to 
2012—will become the first multi-national scheme in the world covering main emitters of all the 
Member States of an enlarged European Union. The program is designed so as to ensure compatibil-
ity to the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol. Currently, the inclusion of Emission Reduction 
Units (ERUs) obtained from JI projects outside the enlarged EU is under consideration. 
• Further examples for such trading schemes are the Canadian Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction 
Trading Pilot or the Chicago Climate Exchange, the first voluntary program in the USA, that even en-
visages an opening to international trade in 2004, or the BP Amoco Emissions Trading System, a 
firm-specific program that was in place prior to 2002 until BP decided to participate in the UK 
scheme. 
2.3. Financing Opportunities for JI Projects 
In addition to trading schemes for GHG emissions within countries, regions and firms, several funds have 
already been established with the intention to develop the market for ERUs through JI or CDM projects 
and purchases of ERUs.10 The first such funds where the Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender 
(ERU-PT) of the Dutch government with a volume of around USD 26 m and the Prototype Carbon Fund of 
the Worldbank (PCF) with a volume of USD 150 m. In 2003, German KfW launched its plans of setting up 
                                                          
7 For example, the USA justified their withdrawal on these grounds. 
8 Annex I countries are all OECD countries except Mexico and South Korea plus all countries in transition. 
9 Among them there are all major expected buyers except of the USA and Australia. 
10 In addition to those funds, there exist also so-called Augmented JI projects. However, since emission credits ob-
tained by those projects will not count as ERUs in the sense of the Kyoto protocol, we refrain from a more detailed 
description. 
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an additional fund with a volume of around USD 80 m. Furthermore, the French government indicated 
similar considerations. In principle, all those funds operate in the same way (for simplicity we focus on 
the case of JI projects, the relevant one for Belarus as Annex I country): 
1. Potential investors put forward a concrete proposal for a project idea that reduces GHG emission lev-
els in a certain Annex I country (henceforth host country). This proposal needs to be approved by the 
fund and endorsed by the government of the host country. 
2. The estimated emission level if the project is realized, as well as the estimated level if the project is 
NOT realized (the so-called baseline) are specified and approved by investor, fund and host country. 
The difference between the two defines the estimated amount of ERUs created through the project. 
3. A verification plan is drafted and an independent certification institution is appointed to measure the 
project outcome, that is the actual emission reduction. 
4. Project starts subject to regulations in verification plan and under supervision of certification institute. 
5. After about one year, the preliminary project outcome is specified. The difference between expected 
emission levels between 2008 and 2012—the commitment period of the Kyoto protocol—and the 
baseline emissions is transferred into ERUs. 
6. ERUs are transferred from the host country’s Assigned Amount to the fund, which rewards the inves-
tor (at present, prices range from USD 3 to 9 per t of CO2e). The fund itself redistributes the ERUs to 
its depositors proportionally to their deposits. 
The crucial issue of JI projects is the specification of the baseline, as illustrated in figure 1. The bold dot-
ted line gives the Assigned Amounts (AAs) per year or a certain host country, the bold straight line the 
actual annual emission levels. A JI project that started prior to 2008 has reduced actual emission levels. 
Compared to business as usual without the project (the baseline), the total amount of ERUs generated 
between 2008 and 2012 is given by the area B. Transferring those ERUs to the fund reduces the host 
country’s AAs by an equal amount A (=B). If the baseline is estimated at the “true” level, the transfer of 
ERUs from the AAs does not affect the country’s net GHG position since it is simply a zero sum transac-
tion. This is the case in figure 1 A. If, however, the baseline is set at too low levels (figure 1 B), than also 
the emission-reducing effect of the project (B) is underestimated. Hence, less ERUs are specified. In this 
case, the corresponding deduction of AAs (A) will also be smaller so that the country benefits since its net 
GHG position increases. Thus, host countries will always seek to set the baseline as low as possible. On 
the other hand, the investor looses from a too low baseline since he obtains less ERUs. Instead, he will 
try to set the baseline as high as possible to generate more ERUs. But, in turn, this tends to reduce the 
country’s net GHG position. It is expected that those diametrical interests of investor and host country 
will lead to a bargaining solution closed to the “true” level. 
Figure 1. Schematic Development of a JI project 
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2.4. Market Outlook 
Since the Kyoto Protocol is not yet in force, the global market for GHG emission certificates is still in its 
early stage of development. Nevertheless, the traded volume in 2001 was already estimated at 55 to 160 
t of CO2e with prices between USD 0.1 and USD 20 per t of CO2e.
11 Most of this demand is caused by al-
                                                          
11 Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF): Annual Report 2001. CO2e.com: Greenhouse Gas Market Overview, December 2001. 
The large differences in trade volume are due to missing obligations for reporting actual deals. 
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ready initiated national, multi-national or firm-specific trading schemes (2.2), by carbon funds (2.3) as 
well as by firm-level demand in anticipation of future obligations. The last point becomes evident by the 
observation that certificates that are compatible with the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol sell 
at a quality premium of about 30%. 
Price formation on the market is mainly determined by expectations of future regulations. The most reli-
able projections are available for future supply and demand of unused emission rights, the AAUs. Accord-
ing to Figure 2, the largest buyers are expected to be Australia, Canada, Japan and the current countries 
of the EU. On the supply side, transition economies are expected to be of main importance, since the 
large drop in output during the 1990s has caused a substantial gap between current emission levels and 
the 1990 levels, the assigned emission target for those countries.12 In addition, Carbon sinks (e.g. 
through afforestation) are expected to contribute some 200 m t and the global volume of ERUs from JI 
and CDM projects is expected at around 300 to 400 m t of CO2e. Under these constellations, a price be-
tween USD 5 and USD 20 per ton of CO2e is expected to clear the market. 
Figure 2. Estimated Supply of unused Emission Rights (AAUs) by Country in 2010 
-400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400
EU candidates
Russian Federation
Ukraine
Belarus
others
Australia
Canada
Japan
EU
(million t of CO2/year)
Source: Petrel, J. (2001). PCF JI project cycle after COP7 and preparedness of EIT countries. 
To summarize, in anticipation of global trade in GHG emission certificates as specified by the Kyoto pro-
tocol, several countries have already initiated national or even multi-national programs. Furthermore, 
carbon funds as well as firm-level demand in anticipation of the future create additional activities. Al-
though it is still too early to assess successes and shortcomings of global GHG emission trade schemes, 
the examples mentioned have already demonstrated that trade of GHG emission certificates is a real is-
sue that can lead to efficient outcomes, both in economic as well as in ecological perspective. 
3. Potential and Benefits for Belarus: 
Having described recent developments and opportunities on the global market for GHG emission certifi-
cates, we will now check the extent to which Belarus could benefit from those developments. 
3.1. The contribution of different categories of sources for GHE 
As a regular party of the UNFCCC, Belarus is obliged to submit reports on climate change policy in regular 
intervals. In the first such report, GDP is expected to grow by factor 2.7-3 between 2000 and 2020, while 
GHG emissions are expected to increase only by factor 1.5 (from 52.4 m to 76.5 m t), which is 36.5 % 
below the level of 1990. The significantly slower growth of GHG emissions compared to GDP is explained 
by decreasing fuel consumption due to switches from oil to gas in energy production together with priori-
tization on resource/energy technologies.  
Table 1. Contribution of Source (Sink) Categories to Aggregate GHG emissions (m. t, per cent) 
Aggregate GHG emissions 
Categories of GHG sources and sinks 
1990 1995 2000 2020 
Energy 107.5 66.7 53.4 75.6 
Industrial processes 2.2 1.2 1.6 1.8 
Agriculture 20.6 12.9 12.8 15.3 
Land-use change and forestry -12.6 -17.7 -18.5 -18.5 
Waste 2.6 2.1 2.9 2.3 
TOTAL 120.5 65.2 52.4 76.5 
Source: First National Communication. 
                                                          
12 Those large contingents of AAUs are commonly referred to as “hot air.” 
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When signing the Kyoto Protocol Belarus intends to assign its level of GHG emissions in 1990 as obliga-
tory emission target for the period from 2008-2012. In this case, and with expected emissions levels 
given in table 1, Belarus will hold an amount of unused Assigned Amounts (AAs) of about 220 m t of 
CO2e. Those units can be entirely transformed in Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) and sold via the Emis-
sions Trading (ET) mechanism. However, selling the entire stock of unused AAs imposes the risk that 
emission certificates will have to be bought from abroad at if the 1990 level becomes binding at some 
point during the second commitment period of the protocol (2013-17). Since as of today no clear rules 
have been defined about the Kyoto mechanisms after 2012, it appears advisable to bank a sufficient 
amount of AAs for those coming periods and sell only about 1/3rd (75 m t). With prices currently esti-
mated within a range of USD 5 to 20 per t of GHG in CO2e,
13 the total potential revenue may be from 
USD 375 m to USD 1.5 bn. 
As argued above, the second—and at this current state of market development more promising—path 
through which Belarus stands to benefit from GHG emission trade are Joint Implementation projects. 
Naturally, an assessment of Belarus’ potential in this segment should start with a quick look at the main 
sources of CO2 emissions in the country. 
The main source of GHG emissions is the Energy sector, which is estimated to account for 80% of aggre-
gate GHG emissions by 2020, followed by agriculture with a share of almost 20%.  The contributions of 
industry of about 2% are fairly insignificant.  
For the percentage figures: land uses, as sink doesn’t create emissions, thus percentage of emission lev-
els relate only to the positive figures. 
The Belarusian energy economy includes fuel mining, transportation, storage and primary processing, 
generation and transmission of electric power and heat. Burning fuel to generate heat and electric power 
is the main source of GHG emissions. Belarus uses mainly natural gas and fuel oil for this purpose, but all 
possible fuel types are fired at small-scale boiler plants as well.  
In view of the determining role of CO2 emission from energy-generation use of fuel, significant reduction 
potential has been identified in modernization of large combustion plants in combination with low effi-
ciency boilers and turbines, incorporating combined heat and power facilities (CHP) There are opportuni-
ties to achieve lower emissions through reduction of power transformation and distribution losses, and 
insulation of hot water and steam piping systems. Besides there are differentiated opportunities for 
growth of renewable energy sources such as wind or solar energy depending on local conditions. 
The major GHG emission sources in Belarus’ industry are the construction industry, metallurgy, chemical 
and petrochemical industries. 
It is envisaged that reconstruction of oil refineries (Mozyr OR and “Naftan” OR) will help improve the de-
gree of oil refining to 85%, i.e. very close to world standards; this will help reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions (primarily carbon oxides) not only at the stage of primary oil refining, but also at all stages of use 
of the final products.  
To conclude, the Belarusian economy and in particular the energy sector appears to be a highly promising 
targets for climate investment through the JI mechanism. However, as with any kind of investment, the 
extent to which investment expectations can be realised depends crucially on the quality of the invest-
ment climate that the country offers. The following section will investigate the investment climate for cli-
mate investment in Belarus and compare it with other economies in Transition. 
3.2. The Investment Climate for JI in Belarus 
In general, there are large potential benefits from JI projects for economies in Transition. In addition to 
reduced investment, JI projects will stimulate further investments and stimulate transfers of modern 
technologies and know-how. Aggregate annual flows of additional environmental investment to econo-
mies in transition in the context of JI projects are estimated to range from USD 2.4 bn to 5.8 bn.11 All 14 
transition countries listed in annex I (incl. Belarus) will have to compete for this investment, and the de-
cision of an climate investor will mainly be driven by the attractiveness of JI projects in a specific country 
and the motivation and ability of the country to host such projects. The investigation about the relative 
position of the 13 transition economies that have already signed the Kyoto Protocol has recently been 
presented by the EBRD. Here, we expand this study by including and comparing Belarus with the other 
13 countries. This analysis attempts to determine, which aspects of Belarus JI investment climate will be 
perceived as attractive by interested investors, and where further improvement is called for. In particular 
the following four factors are investigated: 
1. Scope for cheap emission reduction (Scope for JI); 
                                                          
13 Due to the withdrawal of the USA from the Kyoto Protocol, demand for emissions reductions decreased substantially. 
In contrast, supply of emissions reductions has been largely unaffected leaving to downward pressure on the price on 
the emissions market. 
11 Jan Pretel ‘PCF JI Project Cycle after CoP7 and Preparedness of EIT Countries’ 
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2. The institutional capacity to host JI projects (JI capacity);  
3. The Business environment; 
4. General investment climate, including factors such as political and economic stability, progress in pri-
vatization, liberalization and structural reforms, the quality of the legal system, and the prevalence of 
the corruption. 
Scope for JI 
The scope for cheap emission reductions is typically measured by carbon intensity (carbon emission per 
consumed energy) and energy intensity (energy consumption per GDP). Carbon intensity can be inter-
preted as a rough measure of a country’s fuel switching potential (the replacement of high carbon fuel 
with low carbon fuel). Energy intensity is a kind of approximation of an economy’s potential to improve 
energy efficiency. Figure 1 compares carbon and energy intensities of the 14 Annex I countries in transi-
tion relative to the EU average (EU=100). It turns out that Belarus ranks fifth with Energy Efficiency po-
tential two times above the EU average, while its fuel switching potential is below the EU average. Thus, 
Belarus appears to be particular interesting for projects aiming at improving energy efficiency rather than 
on replacing carbon-intensive energy fuels. 
As a summary indicator and rough measure of countries’ JI potential the expected carbon emission per 
GDP in 2010 is used (Table 1), since it aggregates the carbon intensity (C/E) and energy intensity 
(E/GDP). 
Figure 3. Energy and Carbon Intensity 
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projects etc. The absence of comprehensive JI and climate change strategies may lead to random project 
selection and aimless use of obtained financial resources. It should be noted that despite the technical 
assistance provided by the donor community (e.g. support of the development of emission inventories, 
                                                          
12 The score amounts up to 250 if the national statistics are used. 
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pilot JI projects, so-called Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) projects) the JI institutional capacity of the 
transition countries is still mostly under preparation (see Appendix). 
Nevertheless some countries have already undertaken substantial steps clarifying JI policies and respon-
sibilities within the government. For example, Poland was one of the first EITs, which established a JI 
strategy, and project selection criteria, hosted several pilot projects (AIJ projects) and 5 JI projects, and 
since 1996 has had a JI office. All progress has been summarized in an indicator of JI capacity by the 
EBRD to which we added the corresponding level for Belarus (table 2). 
The results in table 2 show that most advanced countries are Hungary and Czech Republic, followed by 
Poland and Slovakia. Belarus is bad placed, since none of the required steps such as drafting an own JI 
policy or implementing a national registry system have been undertaken thus far. 
Table 1. Indicator of JI scope and production cost 
 Carbon emissions per GDP, 2010 (tones of carbon/million US$) Scope for low cost JI (ranking) 
Ukraine 2530 1 
Bulgaria 1328 2 
Russia 1164 3 
Romania 683 4 
Belarus* 668 5 
Poland 402 6 
Lithuania 393 7 
Czech Republic 380 8 
Estonia 360 9 
Slovak Republic 337 10 
Latvia 296 11 
Hungary 205 12 
Croatia 176 13 
Slovenia 120 14 
Source: EBRD 
*Authors’ assessment 
Table 2. Indicator of JI capacity 
 JI capacity indicator JI capacity ranking 
Czech Republic 4- 1 
Hungary 4- 1 
Slovak Republic 3+ 3 
Poland 3+ 3 
Romania 3 5 
Latvia 3- 6 
Bulgaria 3- 6 
Estonia 3- 6 
Lithuania 2+ 9 
Russia 2 10 
Slovenia 2- 11 
Croatia 2- 11 
Ukraine 1 13 
Belarus* 1- 14 
Source: EBRD. *Authors’ assessment. 
Note: The indicator is based on the following classification system: 
1 Initial national communication, proposals for policies and institutional structures, little training and experience. 
2 Regular national communications, provisional authorities appointed, procedures and responsibilities unclear, some 
training and experience. 
3 Regular national communications, Kyoto ratified, JI policy adopted, provisional authorities appointed, national regis-
try and inventory in place, procedures and responsibilities cleared, good capacity and prior experience. 
4 Kyoto ratified, good inventory, registry established, designated authority, national system under preparation, sup-
plementary information being provided, on course for track two, several JI projects hosted, but no transfer of emission 
reductions yet. 
4+ Eligible for track one, several JI projects hosted and emission reduction units successfully transferred. 
Business environment 
Like any other foreign direct investment, JI projects are rather sensitive to the general business environ-
ment, which they face in transition countries. Table 3 provides the insight into the quality of the business 
climate in EIT and shows that Belarus has the lowest score in almost all indicators except business envi-
ronment assessment (eight place in ranking). As the last evaluation is concerned it presents combined 
measure calculated as an unweighted average across seven dimensions: finance, infrastructure, taxes, 
regulation, judiciary, crime, corruption and for Belarus rather high scores (existence of serious obstacles) 
in taxation, access to finance, regulations – which is the issues for business people everywhere – are 
mitigated by low score in corruption and crime. Furthermore caution is necessary when interpreting the 
BEEPS results as they reflect the experience of firms already active in a country and may differ from per-
ceptions of foreign firms, which consider entering the country. 
 10
Table 3. Qualitative assessment of the business climate 
 
Governance and Enterprise 
restructuring* 
Competition 
policy* 
Infrastructure* 
Business 
Environment** 
Belarus 1 2 1+ 2.14 (8) 
Bulgaria 2+ 2+ 3- 2.22 (10) 
Croatia 3- 2+ 3- 2.11 (7) 
Czech Republic 3+ 3 3 2.01 (6) 
Estonia 3+ 3- 3+ 1.79 (3) 
Hungary 3+ 3 4- 1.77 (2) 
Latvia 3- 2+ 3 1.88 (4) 
Lithuania 3 3 3- 2.01 (6) 
Poland 3+ 3 4- 2.45 (13) 
Romania 2 2+ 3 2.33 (12) 
Russia 2+ 2+ 2+ 1.97 (5) 
Slovak Republic 3 3 2+ 2.19 (9) 
Slovenia 3 3- 3+ 1.67 (1) 
Ukraine 2 2+ 2 2.25 (11) 
* Sources: EBRD. Scores range from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating little progress and 4 (+) vice versa. 
** Sources: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), 2002. The combined measure is cal-
culated as an unweighted average across seven dimensions: finance, infrastructure, taxes, regulation, judiciary, crime 
and corruption. In contrast to the previous three columns, the values range from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating no obstacles 
to business growth and operations and 4 indicating major obstacles. 
Since energy sector is the main source of GHE it can be expected that majority of JI projects will be en-
ergy related in EIT countries and Belarus as well. Hence, as climate investors will look at energy sector 
where reforms are well advanced, for JI projects to materialize, the sector reforms are needed in terms of 
industry structure, governance and the investment climate. Despite substantial progress in reforming en-
ergy sector, subsidized heat and power prices in many transition countries distort the energy market and 
decreases the internal return rates of many energy saving projects, eliminates the economic attractive-
ness of abatement measures. Additionally, subsidized prices do not motivate consumers to save energy. 
Table 4 shows the pricing and revenue collection, which characterize the financial health of the sector and 
its commercial attractiveness for JI investments. 
Table 4. The state of the energy sector 
 Industrial (US cents per kWh) Cash collection rate (in %) EBRD energy sector transition indicator 
Belarus 5.2 50 1 
Bulgaria 3.9 85 3+ 
Croatia 6.7 100 3 
Czech Republic 4.3 - 3 
Estonia 4.1 97 3 
Hungary 5.7 90 4 
Latvia 5.2 100 3 
Lithuania 3.8 91 3 
Poland 4.5 97 3 
Romania 4.8 62 3 
Russia 1.6 97 2+ 
Slovak Republic 4.2 100 4 
Slovenia 7.0 99 3 
Ukraine 2.2 78 3+ 
Source: EBRD 
Notes: For comparison, the long-run marginal cost of Western power systems is around US cents 8 per kWh. The 
EBRD transition indicators are based on the following rating: 
1 The power sector operates as a government department. There is political interference in the running of the indus-
try, with few commercial freedoms or pressures. Average prices are below costs, with external and implicit subsidy 
and cross-subsidy. Very little institutional reform has been achieved. There is a monolithic structure, with no separa-
tion of different parts of the business. 
2 The power company is distanced from the government. It may operate as a jointstock company, but there is still 
political interference. There has been some attempt to harden budget constraints, but management incentives for effi-
cient performance are weak. Some degree of subsidy and cross-subsidy exists. Little institutional reform has been 
achieved. There is a monolithic structure, with no separation of different parts of the business. Minimal, if any, private 
sector involvement has occurred. 
3 A law has been passed providing for full-scale restructuring of the industry, including vertical unbundling through 
account separation and setting-up of a regulator. Some tariff reform and improvements in revenue collection have 
been achieved and there is some private sector involvement. 
4 A law for industry restructuring has been passed and implemented, with separation of the industry into generation, 
transmission and distribution. A regulator has been set up. Rules for cost-reflective tariff –setting have been formu-
lated and implemented. Arrangements for network access (negotiated access, single buyer model) have been devel-
oped. There is substantial private sector involvement in distribution and/or generation. 4+ Business has been sepa-
rated vertically into generation, transmission and distribution. An independent regulator has been set up, with full 
power to set cost reflective effective tariffs. There is large-scale private sector involvement. Institutional development 
has taken place, covering arrangements for network access and full competition in generation. 
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Table 4 provides data that in Belarus the financial ability of JI projects is likely to be affected by poor col-
lection rates, regulatory impediments (few commercial freedom), lack of institutional reforms, and the 
fact that power sector operates as government department. 
Table 5. Country Risk Rating 
 ICRG risk rating Institutional Investor credit rating Euromoney country credit rating Moody’s 
Belarus 59.8 14.4 30.7 - 
Bulgaria 67.3 37.1 42.5 B1 
Croatia 70.3 45.8 49.7 Baa3 
Czech Republic 73.3 60.9 63.1 A1 
Estonia 73.8 55.1 55.7 A1 
Hungary 72.0 64.9 65.2 A1 
Latvia 71.0 47.9 53.1 A2 
Lithuania 71.8 43.7 50.8 Baa1 
Poland 73.8 62.2 63.6 A2 
Romania 58.5 30.3 36.6 B2 
Russia 66.3 26.7 37.9 Ba3 
Slovak Republic 71.5 49.1 53.0 A3 
Slovenia 75.8 67.0 68.9 Aa3 
Ukraine 61.8 17.7 33.1 B2 
Source: World Economic Indicators 
Table 6. Indicator of general investment climate 
 FDI per capita (5-year average, US$) WEF (global ranking) EBRD Investment climate ranking 
Belarus 28.2 - 2 14 
Bulgaria 86.9 62 4- 10 
Croatia 244.4 58 3+ 9 
Czech Republic 412.2 40 4 3 
Estonia 287.9 26 4 1 
Hungary 202.8 29 4 2 
Latvia 152.6 44 4- 8 
Lithuania 140.2 36 4- 5 
Poland 189.9 51 4- 7 
Romania 57.5 66 3+ 11 
Russia 24.6 64 3 12 
Slovak Republic 175.8 49 4 4 
Slovenia 128.6 28 4- 6 
Ukraine 13.0 79 3 13 
Source: EBRD and WEF (2003). 
Note: The WEF index shows the ranking of countries in their global competitiveness table. For comparison, the US is 
ranked first, Germany 14th, France 30th and Italy 39th. The EBRD transition indicators range from 1 (no progress) to 
4+ (fully functioning market economy). The table shows the aggregate score over all reform dimensions assessed by 
the EBRD. The ranking in the final column was obtained by taking the unweighted average over the three indicators. 
General Investment Climate 
The location of JI projects is highly influenced by the level of country risk. Not only JI investors, but pro-
ject sponsors, donor organizations, and supporting institutions (e.g. Prototype Carbon Fund) use in the 
process of decision-making country risk assessment. The ratings are produced by different rating agen-
cies, e.g. Standard& Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch and some others and based on overall economic indicators, as 
well s credit rating of the government.  Table 5 shows the country risk rating of the four agencies, but 
the assessments are broadly consistent across them. 
According to the ratings, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, and Estonia are the least risky 
country, while almost all agencies under consideration13 confer Belarus the highest country risk. For ease 
of comparison, the data on FDI per capita (total FDI is a reasonable proxy for energy-related FDI) is used 
as reflection investment climate, i.e. the relative investors satisfaction with business environment.  Be-
sides two more indicators complement the measurement of business environment. The first is competi-
tiveness index developed by the World Economic Forum and the second, presents aggregate score of the 
EBRD’s transition indicators, which measure progress in privatization, liberalization, enterprise perform-
ance and financial sector reform. 
As it is shown in Table 6 Belarus obtains the lowest investment climate ranking, which means that in Bel-
arus business environment creates the most severe problems among JI transition countries for foreign 
investors. 
Table 7 summarizes all four dimensions, which determine the possibility of JI investment. The indicators 
show that in terms of JI scope Belarus is characterized as particularly attractive, but the country business 
environment and investment climate are notoriously difficult and it seriously lagging behind in developing 
                                                          
13 Moody’s does not include Belarus in assessments. 
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JI capacity. It means that investors may move away towards the countries with more favourable invest-
ment climate. Nevertheless, it should be realized that development of JI capacity and sufficient improve-
ments in business environments together with relatively high scope for JI may develop Belarus into an 
attractive JI country over medium run. 
Table 7. Summary ranking – scope for JI, JI capacity, 
business environment and investment climate 
Rank Scope for JI JI capacity Business environment General Investment climate
1 
2 
3 
4 
Ukraine 
Bulgaria 
Russia 
Romania 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Slovak Republic 
Poland 
Slovenia 
Hungary 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Belarus 
Poland 
Lithuania 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Romania 
Latvia 
Bulgaria 
Estonia 
Lithuania 
Russia 
Czech Republic 
Croatia 
Lithuania 
Belarus 
Lithuania 
Slovenia 
Poland 
Latvia 
Croatia 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Slovak Republic 
Latvia 
Hungary 
Croatia 
Slovenia 
Russia 
Slovenia 
Croatia 
Ukraine 
Belarus 
Slovak Republic 
Bulgaria 
Ukraine 
Romania 
Poland 
Bulgaria 
Romania 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Belarus 
Source: EBRD, authors’ assessment. 
4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
To conclude, global trade in GHG emission certificates has already become reality with trading schemes of 
Denmark, the UK or the EU, as well as activities of multinational firms and trading houses initiating mar-
ket transactions. In addition, an increasing number of carbon funds has stimulated the demand for emis-
sion certificates generated by so-called climate investments within the JI or CDM mechanism of the Kyoto 
protocol. 
How should Belarus respond to these developments? To assess this question, the paper reviews the po-
tential benefits. In addition to the possibility of direct sales of unused emission certificates, we find a par-
ticularly large potential for climate investments. Especially the energy sector is in urgent need for further 
modernization in order to improve energy efficiency. Here, rewards for newly created emission certifi-
cates could be an attractive source of additional financing. In addition, such climate investment schemes 
are also an excellent way to attract foreign investors and new technologies. 
Despite the high potential and promising benefits of international GHG emission trade, several institu-
tional weaknesses as well as political pretermissions prevent Belarus from realizing any of those promis-
ing benefits at the moment. Thus, the following policy recommendations are of crucial importance: 
A) Sign the Kyoto protocol! 
The Kyoto protocol specifies the rules of the game of international GHG emission trade. A country’s signa-
ture under this treaty is the entry ticket for any type of international GHG emission trade. Otherwise, no 
emission reduction can be certified. 
B) Prepare for ratification! 
Two types of activities are necessary: 
1) Economic impact study: 
Each country should assess economic costs and benefits of the regulations of the protocol. We have al-
ready discussed the benefits in detail. The main costs will be for building institutional capacities. As ex-
perience in other transition countries shows, most of those tasks can be (co-)financed by international 
donor organizations.  
2) Emission accounting: 
Each country has to be able to correctly account for its GHG emissions. Therefore, a national emissions 
inventory and allowance registry has to be in place and emission levels have to be reported according to 
the standards of the UNFCCC. 
C) Improve institutional conditions! 
This will be of crucial importance to strengthen the position of Belarus when competing for climate in-
vestments with other transition economies. In part 3 we identify the main institutional weaknesses (see 
table 7). Improving the investment climate is of general economic importance. As for the business envi-
ronment, special emphasize should be given to increasing energy efficiency, in particular in the 
energy sector by improving regulation, cash collection rates and transparency, and by separating the 
power sector from direct government intervention. Most importantly, Belarus must improve its JI ca-
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pacity! An effective and even rewarding way would be to initiate JI projects with carbon funds. 
Typically, this requires signing a Memorandum of Understanding that indicates the country’s approval of 
the rules of international GHG emission trade as specified in the Kyoto protocol. Then, JI projects can be 
initiated and ERUs can even be paid for before the country has ratified the protocol. 
Once those measures are initiated Belarus has made the necessary commitments to UNFCCC in 
order to seize the benefits from international GHG emission trade. 
 
 
Authors: F.P. I.T. 
Lectors: R.G., I.P. 
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Appendix 
JI responsibility and capacity 
 Jl policy National 
registry 
Provisional 
procedures 
Dedicated
Jl office 
Jl staff Institutions involved 
Bulgaria yes no yes yes 1.5 Ministry of Environment and Water 
Croatia draft no no no 5 Ministry of Environment (MZOPU) 
Ministry of Economy (MG) 
Czech Republic na under 
preparation 
yes yes na Ministry of Environment 
Estonia draft no no no 1 Ministry of Environment, Environ-
mental Management: Technology de-
partment 
Hungary draft Under 
preparation 
under 
preparation 
na 2 Ministry of Environment, Atmosphere 
Protection: Energy office 
Latvia draft no being drafted no 5 (in 2003) Ministry of Environmental Protection 
and Regional Development Ministry of 
Finance 
Lithuania under 
discussion
no no no 1 Ministry of Environment: Environ-
mental Quality department 
Poland na no yes yes na National Fund for Environmental Pro-
tection and Water Management 
Romania draft no yes yes 4 Ministry of Environment Ministry of 
Industry and Trade Ministry of Agri-
culture 
Russia no no no being 
reformed 
2 Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade Ministry of Energy Roshy-
dromet 
Slovak Republic yes no yes no 2 Ministry of Environment 
Slovenia proposal proposal no no 7 Proposal to nominate working group 
Ukraine no no no no 0 Ministry of Ecology and Natural Re-
sources 
Belarus* no no no no 0 Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Protection 
Source: Samuel Fankhauser and Lucia Lavric (2002). The investment climate for climate investment: Joint Implemen-
tation in transition countries. EBRD. 
*Authors’ evaluations 
